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Summary
The possibilities and need for adaptation and mitigation depend on uncertain
future developments with respect to socio-economic factors and the climate
system. Scenarios are used to explore the impacts of different strategies under
uncertainty. In this chapter, some scenarios are presented that are used in the
ADAM project for this purpose. One scenario explores developments with no
mitigation, and thus with high temperature increase and high reliance on adapta-
tion (leading to 4 °C increase by 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels). A second
scenario explores an ambitious mitigation strategy (leading to 2 °C increase by
2100 compared with pre-industrial levels). In the latter scenario, stringent mitiga-
tion strategies effectively reduces the risks of climate change, but based on
uncertainties in the climate system a temperature increase of 3 °C or more cannot
be excluded. The analysis shows that, in many cases, adaptation and mitigation are
not trade-offs but supplements. For example, the number of people exposed to
increased water resource stress due to climate change can be substantially reduced
in the mitigation scenario, but even then adaptation will be required for the
remaining large numbers of people exposed to increased stress. Another example
is sea level rise, for which adaptation is more cost-effective than mitigation, but
mitigation can help reduce damages and the cost of adaptation. For agriculture,
ﬁnally, only the scenario based on a combination of adaptation and mitigation is
able to avoid serious climate change impacts.
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3.1 Introduction
The future development of many factors that determine climate change and climate
change policy is highly uncertain. This uncertainty includes, for instance, future
man-made greenhouse gas emissions, the relationship between emissions and actual
impacts and socio-economic developments (which determine the capacity of socie-
ties to adapt to a changing climate). These factors determine both the need and the
possibilities for mitigation and adaptation. Scenario analysis has been developed to
explore different uncertain developments and their consequences. For example, the
scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) have been used in
mitigation, climate analysis, impact and adaptation research, and have provided a
means to compare information across the different research communities that are
involved in these ﬁelds.
Both within the ADAM project and elsewhere in the scientiﬁc community, there
is an interest in exploring the relationships between adaptation and mitigation based
on consistent assumptions. This chapter brieﬂy discusses how scenario analysis can
contribute to an assessment of future adaptation and mitigation strategies. It also
describes scenarios that are used throughout the ADAM project as a common basis
of analysis. These scenarios are based on different combinations of adaptation and
mitigation strategies1 as illustrated conceptually in Fig. 3.1. The ﬁrst two cases
include no mitigation. The ﬁrst case is a baseline scenario, in which we also assume
no explicit adaptation. This scenario is useful as an analytical point of reference, as it
is rather implausible. The other non-mitigation case assumes an efﬁcient adaptation
strategy, reducing climate change impacts. A third scenario includes stringent
mitigation action, and hence less adaptation. While adaptation and mitigation can
partly be regarded as substitutes, they are certainly not mutually exclusive. Effective
climate policy involves a portfolio of both adaptation and mitigation activities. For
example, even with high levels of mitigation, some climate change impacts remain
likely and will require considerable adaptation efforts. In contrast, a high degree of
climate change could make effective adaptation impossible, which means that there
is a need for some minimum level of mitigation.
For the baseline scenario, we assume a continuation of current trends. For this
purpose, we developed a scenario consistent with the WETO-H2 scenario recently
published by the European Commission (EC, 2006). As energy use in such a
scenario is mostly based on fossil fuels, this scenario will lead to considerable
1 In this context, mitigation is deﬁned as activity aiming to avoid impacts by constraining the level of climate
change, whereas adaptation aims at avoiding, or reducing, adverse impacts (or exploiting opportunities) by
adjusting human systems in response to observed or projected climate change.
3. Scenarios as the basis for assessment 55
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/489794/WORKINGFOLDER/HUE/9780521119412C03.3D 56 [54–86] 18.8.2009 5:38PM
climate change. For the mitigation scenario we focus on the target of current EU
climate policy: a maximum of 2 °C of temperature increase compared with pre-
industrial levels. Using the median value for climate sensitivity given by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of 3 °C (Meehl et al., 2007),
this translates into a stabilisation level of 450 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e.).
While Fig. 3.1 suggests that the costs and beneﬁts of mitigation, adaptation and
residual damages can be weighed against each other, there are several challenges in
the appraisal of long-termmitigation and adaptation strategies (see also Section 3.4.8).
Spatial and temporal scales of proposed action are very important. Both mitiga-
tion and adaptation happen at various spatial scales ranging from individual house-
holds to the global scale. For mitigation, beneﬁts always occur globally – despite the
fact that action is taken at national or local level. A critical factor in limiting
mitigation costs is international cooperation (or competition) in technology devel-
opment. For adaptation, in contrast, both costs and beneﬁts occur at the local scale,
though a supportive environment created at a larger spatial scale (e.g. in a multi-
national entity, such as the European Union) can enhance adaptation at a smaller
scale. Mitigation action involves some form of international co-operation, while
adaptation is mostly explored at the local scale. From this perspective, Fig. 3.1 is an
enormous simpliﬁcation of the real problem, as costs occur at different points in
Fig. 3.1. Climate policy leads to different combinations of three types of costs:
mitigation costs, adaptation costs and residual damage (illustration). The ﬁgure
also illustratively indicates the position of the ADAM scenarios. (Source: based on
Klein et al., 2007).
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time and for different actors and stakeholders. The challenge of bringing adaptation
issues into scenarios is discussed further in Chapter 4.
The temporal scale of mitigation and adaptation also varies over a wide range.
Stringent mitigation scenarios typically require strong early reduction of emissions.
However, the impacts in these scenarios will in the short term, and will hardly vary
from those in scenarios without climate change policy. The impacts in stringent
mitigation scenarios typically only diverge from impacts in scenarios without
mitigation after a few decades due to the high inertia of the climate system.
Adaptation measures can often be implemented over a shorter time scale and
become effective immediately, but some important exceptions exist, which may
require decades to implement, such as changes in spatial planning or large scale
engineering works for ﬂood protection.
Other important factors are risk and uncertainty. The cause–effect chain of
climate change (see Fig. 3.2) is beset with risks (quantiﬁable as probability density
functions with various, often asymmetrical, forms) and uncertainties. At each main
stage of the chain, the uncertainties are due to different factors. Examples of factors
affecting the various stages are: (i) emissions, affected by economic development;
(ii) the climate system, affected by unknown climate sensitivities; (iii) adaptive
capacity, affected by costs of infrastructure; and (iv) mitigation, affected by the
wide range of costs of mitigation. Mitigation reduces the uncertainties, since it
reduces the originating sources of climate change (Barker, 2003; Piani et al., 2005).
But mitigation and adaptation may both add to risks. For example, some geo-
engineering options may compound risks of climate change by attempting to offset
one set of risks (climate) while creating another set of different risks (e.g. ocean
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Fig. 3.2. Driving force–pressure–state–impact–response framework for climate
change. Thick lines indicate direct linkages. Solid small lines indicate potentials
feedback (many of which are not included in current scenarios). The dashed lines
indicate categories that are generally used to explore the impact/costs/beneﬁts of
different scenarios.
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acidiﬁcation). Exploring uncertainties should be part of a robust decision-making
process, but makes appraisal much more difﬁcult. Among other issues, differences
in risk perception become relevant. One way of dealing with risks is to include
assessments of probabilities. This is often done on the basis of past evidence,
extrapolated to cover speciﬁc future circumstances. Uncertainties (unknown or
unknowable shocks and surprises) are more difﬁcult to represent numerically, but
justify precaution and acknowledgement of ignorance. Scenarios can explore the
potential for extreme events and the robustness of various policy portfolios to
address the problem and to reduce the risks and uncertainties in the system (we
come back to this in Section 3.4.2).
In this chapter we discuss the two extreme ADAM scenarios: a baseline scenario
in which global mean temperature increases by 4 °C above pre-industrial levels,
and a scenario with considerable mitigation efforts in which global mean tempera-
ture increase is limited to 2 °C. These scenarios have been developed as a basis of
analysis for the whole ADAM project to enhance consistency in the analyses
performed by various work packages. We describe the assumptions that have
been made and indicate their major outcomes. We also discuss whether the mostly
linear approach taken here in scenario development is warranted, given expected
impacts, or whether a more integrated approach should be used for future analysis.
In our descriptions, we focus on the global level (in view of the limited space).
Clearly, adaptation decisions need more detail. Such detail is included in the under-
lying analysis not presented here; it would also need to come from more country or
sector level analysis, for example, as presented in Chapter 8.
3.2 Scenario development
3.2.1 Types of scenarios
Based on the considerations about mitigation and adaptation described in the
introduction, different types of scenarios can be deﬁned.Firstly, we deﬁne a baseline
scenario, as a trajectory of events assuming no major feedbacks from climate
change and no speciﬁc policy efforts on either mitigation or adaptation (such
scenarios are also sometimes referred to as ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios). The
main purpose of this type of scenario is analytical, serving as a point of reference
for other scenarios, and a starting point for both mitigation and adaptation analysis.
Secondly, adaptation scenarios describe a world responding to climate change
impacts. Their purpose is to explore the type of technologies and policies required
to adapt to climate change, and the associated costs. Thirdly, mitigation scenarios
describe a world with policies aiming to limit climate change.
In ADAM, a scenario has been developed with ambitious mitigation policies
aiming to reach a 2 °C target (also called low-stabilisation scenarios). Its purpose is
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to explore the type of technologies and policies required to minimise climate
change, and the associated costs of some of these technologies and policies.
In reality, future development may combine some of these elements (and aim for
intermediate targets).
The scenarios can be used in different ways. Firstly, a qualitative description
(storylines) and quantitative analysis can be used to describe the kind of conditions
associated with certain development trajectories. Secondly, one may explore the
implications of these scenarios, either in terms of physical impacts (e.g. change of
climate or biodiversity loss) or in terms of costs associated with mitigation, adapta-
tion or (residual) damages. In exploring a preferred mix of mitigation, adaptation
and residual damage, two main approaches exist: (i) the risk-based approach that
describes potential impacts as function of global mean temperature increase (and
thus mitigation), and (ii) cost–beneﬁt analysis that looks at the same impacts, but
now in monetary terms. Most studies indicate that mitigation efforts, and associated
costs, increase for scenarios aiming at lower greenhouse gas concentrations (Fisher
et al., 2007). At the same time, assessments of impacts indicate that the magnitude
of impacts and adaptation costs (and, in particular, the sum of these two) increases
for higher temperatures and concentration levels (see e.g. (Parry et al., 2007; Stern,
2006). The result is a virtual trade-off between mitigation, climate change damages
and adaptation costs along the concentration line. However, for several reasons
outlined in the introduction, such a trade-off cannot really be made. Moreover,
uncertainties play a critical role in baseline development, technological develop-
ment, climate impacts and climate sensitivity.
3.2.2 Further integration
In climate analysis, scenarios are generally developed in a manner consistent with
the driver–pressures–state–impacts–responses (DPSIR) framework (Fig. 3.2).
Using this approach, the development of scenarios starts by describing changes
in economic activities (income, energy use, agriculture, etc.) and estimating the
resulting emissions. These emissions become inputs to climate models, whose
outputs are estimates of climate impacts (as done for the SRES scenarios mentioned
before) or, in case of integrated assessment models (IAMs), to a climate model
included in the IAM. Next, changes in climate variables are used to assess possible
impacts and, in some cases, adaptation opportunities.
The DPSIR framework is also used to develop scenarios for IPCC reports.
Scenarios are developed by Working Group III researchers focusing on devel-
opment of driving forces, energy system and land use parameters in baseline and
mitigation scenarios. Subsequently, they are run by Global Circulation Models
in Working Group I analyses to assess climate change. Finally, the scenarios are
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used for Impact, Adaptation and Vulnerability analyses by Working Group II
researchers. In fact, many integrated assessment models are built around a
similar approach. This implies that possible feedbacks from climate change on
driving forces, energy system or land use are typically not considered in the
IPCC assessment, but also that very few models include any of these feedbacks.
Ignoring these feedbacks might only be scientiﬁcally sound if those feedbacks
are not substantial enough to undermine the likelihood of the original scenario.
For analytical reasons, there are major advantages to organising scenario devel-
opment in a linear way along the DPSIR framework. It enables research to focus
on elements of the chain, without the complication of interlinkages between the
elements, uncertain feedbacks etc. In the context of integrated analysis of both
mitigation and adaptation needs and opportunities, this may, however, not be
sufﬁcient. Some examples of why an integrated approach might be necessary are
as follows.
(i) Climate impacts could be substantial in agriculture. In such cases, estimates of land-use
related emissions not taking impacts into account might be wrong, and the mitigation
potential of bio-energy could also be affected.
(ii) Climate impacts may be so severe that they undermine the economic assumptions of
the original scenario.
(iii) Land areas might be attractive for both mitigation and adaptation purposes.
An interesting question therefore is whether impacts are indeed so severe that a
more integrated approach of scenario development should be preferred, or whether
the impacts can be handled separately (as they mostly have until now), simplifying
the analysis framework. The few available studies that looked at the inter-
relationships between adaptation and mitigation indicate that, in most sectors, the
adaptation implications of any mitigation project are small and, conversely, the
emissions generated by most adaptation activities are only small fractions of total
emissions (Klein et al., 2007). In the scenarios presented here, based on the current
state of the art in modeling and scenario development, we also ignore most feed-
backs. However, we will discuss the impacts of different strategies, and by the end
of the chapter come back to the question of whether more integrated (but also more
complex) scenarios need to be developed.
3.2.3 Approaches to scenario development and their use in ADAM
The use of scenarios within ADAM illustrates different approaches to scenario
application. One approach is to use scenarios to analyse the same climate goals
with different models (parallel approach). In ADAM, this approach is used in
Chapter 11, where integrated models covering the overall global energy system
have systematically analysed the implication of achieving stringent mitigation
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targets using the ADAM scenarios. Model assumptions were harmonised on the
basis of the ADAM scenarios for income, population and as far as possible the
energy system, in the case of the baseline scenario. For the mitigation scenario,
modelling teams were free to follow the greenhouse gas emission proﬁle, the
cumulative emissions or the concentration target. The use of multiple models,
following alternative approaches, provides insight into uncertainty. The results
can, in fact, be seen as an improvement of the original scenario by providing
alternative pathways for the same storyline.
The second approach deepens the original scenario by using more detailed
models (serial approach). The more detailed model uses the default scenario
descriptions as boundary conditions, such as annual temperature and precipitation
proﬁles. The interesting aspect of this approach is that disciplinary strengths of
many different models are used. This approach was employed here and in subse-
quent chapters in assessing the expected impacts of the two scenarios. This
improves the original scenario by providing in-depth analysis of the consequences
of the scenario. The shortcoming of this method is that possible interactions are
often difﬁcult to handle (as they require feedbacks and iterations).
In some cases, the coupled scenario development exercise may itself be highly
integrated, or can be coupled in a more interactive way to the original scenario.
In such a case, the models complement each other, providing an improved assess-
ment by integrating various disciplinary models. To some degree, the coupled
analysis within ADAM, assessing mitigation and adaptation of the European
energy system, is an example of this. A description of this work is given in
Chapter 7.
3.3 The ADAM scenarios
As explained in the introduction, in ADAM, a set of scenarios is used to explore
different combinations of mitigation and adaptation. For analytical purpose, we
deﬁne a baseline scenario without mitigation action leading to a global mean
temperature increase of about 4 °C by the end of the century. Two variants of
this scenario are used: one without adaptation (and thus high impacts) and one
with adaptation. In terms of socio-economic projections the scenarios are con-
sidered to be the same (ignoring for analytical reasons some of the feedbacks).
Finally, the mitigation scenario is based on a stringent mitigation strategy
leading to an increase of about 2 °C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. Here,
we brieﬂy discuss the different assumptions and results. Various storylines may
lead to these scenarios. Box 3.1 presents two different possibilities for each
scenario. The scenarios were used for various purposes in the ADAM project
(see Chapters 4,7,8 and 11).
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3.3.1 Population development and economic growth.
The ADAM baseline scenario uses the 2004 revision of world population projec-
tions (UN, 2005) up to 2050, and the UN’s long-range medium projections over the
period 2050–2100 (Fig. 3.3). The projections are based on the medium-fertility
variant with global populations steadily increasing to reach a total of almost 9.1
billion people by 2050, leveling off and stabilising at about 9.2 billion people over
the subsequent 50 years up to 2100. According to the UN’s deﬁnition, medium-
fertility rests on the assumption that total fertility in all countries converge towards a
level of 1.85 children per woman (though not all countries reach this level by 2050).
The population growth patterns that are used in the ADAM baseline scenario take
a middle ground within the range of population forecasting. This is because the UN
Box 3.1. Storylines for climate policy
The development of emissions strongly depends on the development of international
climate policy. In considering international climate policy, one may consider two
important factors: (i) the ambition with respect to mitigation and (ii) the degree of
international coordination. Together these create four caricature storylines: (i) adapt
alone, (ii) sharing the costs, (iii) technology competition, and (iv) Kyoto++. The ﬁrst
two storylines would coincide with the high emission scenario, while the latter two
storylines could possibly coincide with the low emission scenario. Table 3.1 provides
the main characteristics of each of these storylines. The adapt alone scenario does little
mitigation action and organises adaptation at the local scale. In the sharing the costs
scenario international climate policy fails to organise mitigation actions, but is still able
to organise international mechanisms to ﬁnance adaptation costs (complying to
responsibility and/or the polluters-pays-principle). The technology competition
scenario starts from local, technology-focused mitigation policies without binding
international commitments (an important challenge here is whether countries
voluntarily invest enough in new technologies in the next one to two decades). Whether
such a scenario may reduce emissions enough to limit global mean temperature increase
to 2 °C is an open question. Finally the Kyoto++ storyline emphasises a development
pathway based on co-ordinated international climate policy with binding commitments.
The fact that more than one storyline could lead to similar emission scenarios (as
emphasised earlier by (Nakicenovic et al., 2000)) implies that even with a set target,
various policy options exists. That does not mean that all pathways are equally likely to
lead to similar outcomes. For instance, the stringent mitigation scenario described in this
chapter will require early participation of developing countries in order to achieve the
global emission reduction as described. Such an ambitious reduction is arguably more
likely to be achieved under an international co-ordination framework than under a more
locally orientated, more fragmented regime such as the technology competition case.
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Table 3.1. Four storylines for international climate policy
Adapt alone
Sharing
the costs
Technology
competition Kyoto++
Focus of
climate
policy
Adaptation Adaptation Stringent
mitigation and
adaptation
Stringent
mitigation and
adaptation
International
cooperation
Autonomous Coordinated Autonomous Coordinated
Characteristics
of climate
policy
Government
policy to
ensure access
to cheap
energy;
abandonment
of Kyoto-style
approaches;
Adaptation at
local scale
No agreements
on emission
reductions
leads to failure
of mitigation;
but developing
countries are
able to get an
UNFCCC type
agreement on
sharing
adaptation
costs.
High technology
orientation,
but little
international
institutional
arrangements;
dedicated
technology
ﬁxes; both
cooperation and
competitive
relationships
across different
regions;
High level of
mitigation
based on high
level of
international
coordination.
Universal and
effective
governance
structure.
Adaptation
mostly at local
level.
Outcome High level
of climate
change
High level
of climate
change
Low level
of climate
change
Low level
of climate
change
Fig. 3.3. (a) Population development and (b) economic growth in the ADAM
scenario compared with recently published scenarios (for economic growth the
database of scenarios as compiled for IPCC (Fisher et al., 2007) was used).
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indicates both low and high-fertility variants with projections varying from 7.8
billion (low series) to 10.6 billion (high series) by 2050 (Fisher et al., 2007). The
extent of uncertainties are illustrated by the wide range of projections available in
the literature. For example the IPCC in its SRES report displays a range from just
above 6 billion to over 15 billion of people to inhabit the planet by 2100. Higher or
lower population numbers will impact on both the demand-side through changes in
consumption, and on the supply-side by affecting the availability of labour supply.
These both in turn affect future growth prospects.
It should be noted that the economic growth projections presented in the ADAM
baseline are only partially linked to the UN population projections. There is no
direct feedback between the expected economic growth and changes in fertility, life
expectancy rates and international migration ﬂows, other than those taken into
account in the UN’s calculation of future population increases. Nevertheless,
long-term growth rates underpinning the ADAM baseline do draw partly on popu-
lation developments, particularly on likely future urban–rural migration ﬂows
across major economies. That is, the greater the availability of under-utilised labour
resources and the higher the scope for rural–urban migration, the greater the
perspectives for long-term sustained growth, as growth processes are arguably
concentrated and dominating in large urban areas and city centres
In terms of economic growth, Fig. 3.3 shows the baseline scenario to be a high
economic growth scenario, which is mainly the result of optimistic growth assump-
tions for China and India (cf. Fisher et al., 2007). Outside these regions, ADAM
assumptions are comparable to other more medium projections. The high income
(western) economies are project to remain the richest in per capita terms. In terms of
total economic activity, however, the importance of developing regions grows
rapidly, especially in much of Asia, particularly China and India, and in Latin
America. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, growth is between
zero and two percent per annum in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. In
Asia, it falls steeply from the current seven percent per annum to four percent per
annum between 2010 and 2030 and to less than three percent per annum by 2050.
This largely reﬂects the end of the rapid catch-up process currently experienced by
Asian economies and the economic slowdown as consequence of the ageing
population in China.
3.3.2 Energy use and greenhouse gas emissions
Baseline scenario
Energy use in the ADAM baseline scenario is based on the baseline published
earlier by the European Commission (EC, 2006). The scenario shows energy
intensity of the world economy in 2050 falls to about half of the 2001 value, and
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by 2100 it is halved again (Fig. 3.4).World energy consumption however, more than
doubles in the 2000–2050 period and increases by another 25% in the 2050–2100
period. Over the whole century, energy supply remains dominated by fossil fuels. At
about 2040, conventional oil production peaks. Production of unconventional oil
increases to compensate for reduced conventional oil production, so that total oil
production does not decrease signiﬁcantly before 2060. The peak of natural gas
production occurs considerably later (around 2070). With an increase in coal use,
the contribution of non-fossil energy sources to total primary production does not
decrease signiﬁcantly. The high degree of coal use (almost half of all energy used in
2100) reﬂects the relative abundance of coal, for which resource scarcity is not
expected to play a role in limiting production or signiﬁcantly increasing cost in any
foreseeable future. The amount of non-fossil energy production also increases
substantially. Nuclear energy use increases by a factor of two to three to 76 EJ
over the period until 2100, the use of biomass increases strongly, while hydro-
electricity production increases by about 60 to 80%. All these resources grow
further after 2050. The largest relative increase is that of wind and solar energy;
Fig. 3.4. (a) Global primary energy use for the baseline scenario and (b) the 450 ppm
scenario (right). (c) Global CO2e. emissions for the baseline scenario and (d) the
450 ppm scenario (right). (Source: TIMER model). (See colour plate section.)
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this rises from less than one percent of all non-fossil energy to between 10 and
14 percent in 2050. Between 2050 and 2100, wind and solar energy double again.
Total renewable energy use in 2050 is 120 to 140 EJ, and 190 EJ in 2100.
As a result of the trends described above, emissions of carbon dioxide from
energy activities more than double until 2050, and rise by a third again between
2050 and 2100 (see Fig. 3.5). This scenario is consistent with a large range of other
scenarios in scientiﬁc literature (Fisher et al., 2007).
Land-use-related emissions of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide
(in particular methane) increase steadily in the period 2000 to 2050 (driven by
increasing agricultural production), but at a slower rate than energy-related carbon
dioxide. In the second half of the century, a stabilising population also leads to a
stabilisation of agricultural emissions. The ADAM baseline scenario lies at the low
end of the range of similar scenarios that have recently been published (Rose et al.,
2008). Carbon dioxide emissions from land-use fall back to zero during the ﬁrst half
of the century.
Mitigation scenario
The ADAM mitigation scenario corresponds to the ambition of the EU to limit
global mean temperature increase to maximum 2 °C compared to pre-industrial
levels (using a best-guess value for climate sensitivity). This scenario aims at
stabilising greenhouse gases at around 450 ppm CO2e after an initial overshoot to
about 510 ppm CO2e (den Elzen and Van Vuuren, 2007).
The emission reduction is achieved in various ways. One element is to increase
energy efﬁciency, which reduces the total amount of energy use. By 2050, energy is
reduced by more than 20% in this scenario compared to the baseline (see Fig. 3.4).
Fig. 3.5. World carbon dioxide emissions from energy production and use in the
baseline scenario compared to emissions according to other scenarios.
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Another measure seen in this scenario is a switch away from coal to natural gas,
especially during the ﬁrst half of the century, when other technologies for emission
reduction are still underdeveloped. Oil use is also reduced, so that ‘peak oil’ due to
depletion is not reached, as in the baseline scenario, and unconventional oil
resources are minimally exploited. The scenario also shows an increasing use of
energy from non-fossil sources, which account for most of the growth in total energy
use. Non-fossil energy use increases from about 15% of total primary energy use in
2010 to more than 30 percent in 2050 and is over 40% of the total by the end of the
century. Most of this growth is due to an increase in bio-energy use. Finally, carbon
capture and storage is applied in most remaining stationary uses of fossil fuels. In
addition, also non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. As a
result, global emissions peak around 2020, and reduce further with time. By
2050, emissions are reduced by more than 70% compared to the baseline and
more than 80 percent by 2100 .The consequences of the mitigation policies are
not only obvious for energy, but also for global land use. Substantial land areas are
used for afforestation and bio-energy (see Fig. 3.6).
3.3.3 Climate change
The atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration, in CO2e, resulting from the emis-
sions of the two scenarios is shown in Fig. 3.7. There is some uncertainty in the
concentration levels, because of uncertainties in the carbon cycle. The ﬁgure also
shows the global temperature change and the solid lines indicate the outcome for
best-guess assumptions (such as a climate sensitivity of 3 °C). The shaded area
indicates the uncertainty due to carbon cycle and climate sensitivity. Global mean
temperature under the baseline case increases almost linearly to 2.1 °C above the
Fig. 3.6. Land use in the different scenarios. Geographic details are for illustration
only. The ﬁgure shows the visible impact of land-use related mitigation options on
future global land use. (See colour plate section.)
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pre-industrial levels in 2050 and to 3.7 °C in 2100. The uncertainty in these values,
however, ranges from 3 to 5 °C. In the mitigation scenario, the global mean
temperature increase by 2100 reduces to 1.9 °C for the best-guess assumptions.
Again, there is considerable uncertainty, and in fact, during the ﬁrst decades the
temperature range of the baseline case and the mitigation scenario strongly overlap.
By the end of the century, however, there is a clear difference. Even so, Fig. 3.7
indicates that the mitigation case could also lead to a temperature increase of 2.6 °C
compared with pre-industrial levels.
The mitigation scenario presented here is among the most stringent in scientiﬁc
literature, and two important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, global warming can
be mitigated but not be stopped; the most stringent scenarios still lead to an increase
of about 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, whilst assuming there is global co-
operation to reduce emissions from about 2015/2020 onwards. Secondly, because
this stringent scenario could also lead to considerably greater climate change,
adaptation policies could be hedged against the higher numbers. For example,
such policies may be to ‘aim for 2 °C, but prepare for 3 °C’. In the assessment of
impacts below, we focus on the central climate change projections.
Models agree that the level of temperature and precipitation change will not be
the same at different locations. The patterns of change are, however, very different
across the models. Some general trends can be observed; for example, the change in
annual mean temperature is larger at high latitudes than at low latitudes. In terms of
precipitation, however, differences across models are even greater; there are only a
Fig. 3.7. Atmospheric carbon dioxide equivalent concentration (taking into account
the Kyoto gases) (a) for the baseline scenario (4 °C, no climate policy) andmitigation
scenario (2 °C) (left) and (b) global temperature change (since the pre-industrial age)
for the same two scenarios (right). Ranges are based on van Vuuren et al., 2008.
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few places where the majority of models agree on whether there is an increase or
decrease (e.g. all models expect Southern Europe to be become drier). The patterns
used for the ADAM scenarios are shown in Fig. 3.8.
3.4 Impacts and adaptation in the different scenarios
3.4.1 Introduction
The Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) gives an
overview of impacts associated with climate change. Some of these impacts result
from changes in climate averages, but other impacts (and arguably more severe
ones) may result from changes in extreme events. Table 3.2 summarises some of the
main impacts. There are six broad categories of important impacts: health, agricul-
ture, water availability, coastal ﬂooding, urban areas and energy system, and large-
scale disruptions of the climate system. In this section, we sketch some impacts
and adaptation requirements under the two main ADAM scenarios (baseline and
Fig. 3.8. Map of change of annual mean temperature and precipitation in 2100
relative to 1990; (a) temperature; scenario: baseline (leading to 4 °C warming in
2100); (b) temperature; scenario: mitigation (2 °C); (c) precipitation; scenario:
baseline (leading to 4 °C warming in 2100); (d) precipitation; scenario: mitigation
(2 °C). (See colour plate section.)
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Table 3.2. Possible impacts of climate change
Impacts associated with global
average temperature change
Impacts due to changes in extreme
events
Health Increasing burden from
malnutrition, diarrhoeal,
cardio-respiratory and infectious
diseases. This will affect
particularly populations with low
adaptive capacity
1. Reduced mortality from cold
exposure, increased risk of heat
related morbidity and mortality
(heat waves)
2. Risks related to heavy
precipitation events (deathes,
injuries and diseases)
3. Food and water shortage and
increased risk of water- and
food- borne diseases as a result of
drought
4. Risks related to ﬂoods
Population migration with
associated health risks due to
droughts, ﬂoods, increased
incidence of extreme high sea
level
Food Negative impacts on vulnerable
groups. Region speciﬁc changes
(both positive and negative) in
cereal crop productivity.
1. Changed yields in agriculture
(due to extreme temperatures,
droughts, heavy precipitation)
2. Land erosion and degradation
(due to heavy precipitation
events, droughts)
Increased livestock deaths
(due to drought)
Water Increased availability in some areas,
decreased availability and
increasing drought and water
stress in other areas. Effects are
both through changes in rainfall +
evapotranspiration and through
changes in snow and ice melt.
This will affect agriculture.
1. Effects on water resources
relying on snowmelt and glaciers
(due to changed extreme
temperatures)
2. Effects on water supplies (due to
changed extreme temperatures,
changed seasonality, droughts,
heavy precipitation events)
3. Increased water demand (due to
heat waves, droughts)
4. Changed (reduced or increased)
hydropower generation
potentials due to changing
droughts
Coasts Increased damage from ﬂoods and
storms due to sea level rise. This
will affect low-lying coastal
systems.
Increased risk and costs of coastal
protection from extreme weather
events.
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mitigation) within these categories. The descriptions are not intended to be exhaus-
tive, but instead provide some indication of the magnitude of impacts and adaptation
challenges. We also use the results to discuss the possibilities and the need to
develop more integrated scenarios.
3.4.2 Human health: temperature-related mortality and malaria
Climate change inﬂuences human health in various ways. It is likely, however, to
remain a relatively minor factor compared to other drivers that impact human health
(such as life-style related factors) (Hilderink et al., 2008). We focus here on climate
change impacts on temperature related mortality and malaria.
Temperature related mortality
The effect of heat, in the form of heatwaves, on mortality has been described in
various studies. The strongest physiological evidence for additional mortality levels
is available for cardiovascular disease. The impact of climate change may occur via
changes in extreme temperatures, changes in average temperatures or in seasonal
Table 3.2. (cont.)
Impacts associated with global
average temperature change
Impacts due to changes in extreme
events
Industry,
settlements
and society
Affected by impacts in all of the
above categories, compounding
pressures associated with rapid
urbanisation, industrialisation and
aging in some societies.
The most vulnerable are generally
those in ﬂood plains, those whose
economies are closely linked with
climate-sensitive resources and
the poor.
Affected by impacts in all of the
above categories. Speciﬁc
impacts include:
1. Changes in energy demand for
space conditioning
2. Reduced quality of life due to
heat waves for people without
appropriate housing,
3. Disruption due to ﬂooding
caused by heavy precipitation
4. Water shortages due to drought
5. Disruption due to cyclones
6. Increased costs of coastal
protection from extreme high sea
level
Large-scale
disruption
1. Partial loss of ice sheets on polar land implies metres of sea level rise.
Rapid sea level rise on century time scales cannot be excluded.
2. Large-scale and persistent changes in the meridional overturning
circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean could cause various changes to
ocean behaviour.
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variation of temperature and the literature shows varying results. McMichael et al.
(1996) made an estimation of temperature-related mortality using relative risk
ratios, showing that there is an optimum temperature at which the death rate is
lowest (also know as the U-shaped dose-response relation) (McMichael et al.,
1996). This study also shows that for higher temperatures heat stress-related
mortality increases, whereas cold-related mortality decreases. Tol (2002) concluded
that, in monetary terms, the reduction in cold-related mortality due to climate
change will outnumber the increase in heat-related mortality. This conclusion is,
however, strongly inﬂuenced by the approach used to value a life and also subject to
the large uncertainties in the relationships between temperature and health.
Adaptation may occur both by the adjustment of the human physiology to higher
temperatures (McMichael et al., 1996) and an increase of air conditioning use
(Kinney et al., 2008). Given the complexities in using dose–response relationships
between temperature and mortality, we have not directly related them to the two
ADAM scenarios.
Malaria
Annually more than onemillion people, mostly African children, die frommalaria, a
vector-born infectious disease. Malaria vectors spreading the infection, i.e. the
anopheles mosquitoes, can only survive in climates with high average temperatures,
no frost and sufﬁcient precipitation. The MARA/ARMA malaria suitability model
(Craig et al., 1999) incorporates these factors to determine climatically suitable
areas –which was run for the ADAM scenarios (Fig. 3.9) (see Appendix for details).
Fig. 3.9. Death due to malaria in the baseline scenario and in the mitigation scenario.
The ‘no GDP growth’ scenario has been added to illustrate the importance of socio-
economic development on malaria deaths.
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The number of deaths from malaria are predominantly inﬂuenced by factors such as
access to preventative measures, such as insecticide-treated bed nets, and access to
health care, both of which are linked to income and urbanisation. This is demon-
strated by comparing a hypothetical scenario without GDP growth and the baseline
scenario: the assumed income growth reduces malaria deaths by around 50 percent
and suggests that adaptation strategies might be similarly effective. The difference
between the mitigation scenario and the baseline case however, is much smaller;
mitigation reduces malarial health risks by about 2 percent.
3.4.3 Agriculture: Impacts on yields
For the IPCC, Easterling et al. (2007) have synthesised a large amount of research
on the impacts on crops of incremental temperature change, with or without
adaptation. Their information represents an overview of the best knowledge cur-
rently available on the impact of climate change on crop yields (both with and
without adaptation) and therefore we have compared their results to our scenarios.
Easterling et al. (2007) have summarised the results using best-ﬁt polynomials of
the percentage yield change as a function of mean local temperature change2. These
results can be used to estimate the potential global impacts of the ADAM baseline
and mitigation scenarios, with and without adaptation, for maize, wheat and rice.
Figure 3.10 shows the yield change according to Easterling et al. (2007) at low
latitudes (tropics) and at mid to high latitudes (temperate zones) at temperature
Fig. 3.10. Indicative results for the sensitivity of maize, wheat and rice yield change
at low and mid- to high-latitudes to climate change for each of four scenarios
(following Easterling et al. (2007)
2 We have in each case taken the global mean temperature change for a scenario and used that as an indication of the
average local temperature change to be expected.
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changes equal to the global mean temperature change in 2100 according to the
ADAM scenarios. Although the results are highly uncertain, some preliminary
conclusions seem to be possible from this ﬁgure. Firstly, the baseline scenario,
with high climate change and no adaptation, causes a very substantial decrease in
yields for all cases shown., Climate impacts. especially in the tropics, may reduce
yields by 10 to 35 percent for the crops studied. Secondly, engaging in either
mitigation or adaptation limits the decrease in yields and, in some cases, may enable
an increase in yields. In the tropics, impacts remain negative and typically in the
order of a 10 percent loss. Thirdly, the mitigation scenario with adaptation may
result in an improvement from today’s situation.
The importance of mitigation is illustrated by the analysis of Tubiello and Fischer
(2007), who found that when comparing a non-mitigated scenario with a mitigation
scenario, global costs of climate change in agriculture were reduced by 75% to
100% with mitigation, and the number of additional people at risk of malnutrition
was reduced by 80 to 95%. The importance of adaptation may be seen in the work of
the same authors (Fischer et al., 2007) on climate change impacts on water irrigation
requirements, where they found that mitigation reduced the impacts of climate
change on agricultural water requirements by about 40%, This leaves 60% of the
effects of climate change on irrigation requiring adaptation.
These results underline the need to look at both mitigation and adaptation. While
mitigation limits the damages of climate change, adaptation is still necessary, since
even with 2 °C mean climate change, impacts can be signiﬁcant.
3.4.4 Water resources: potential water availability
The effects of the two ADAM scenarios on water resources are assessed using a
global-scale water resources impact model (Arnell, 2003)3. Figure 3.11 shows the
percentage change in average annual runoff by 2100 (relative to the 1961–1990
mean) under the baseline scenario and the mitigation scenario. The differences
between the scenarios in change in runoff are similar to, but slightly larger than,
the relative difference in change in global average temperature under the two
scenarios. For example, the change in temperature by 2050 is approximately
20 percent smaller under the mitigation than the baseline scenario (1.7 °C compared
to 2.2 °C), and the change in runoff is generally between 20 and 25% smaller.
The human implications of the difference between the baseline and mitigation
scenarios can be assessed by examining changes in runoff in watersheds exposed to
water resource stress (here deﬁned to have runoff less than 1000m3/capita/year).
The results show quite substantial differences in exposure to increased water
3 We used pattern-scaling to obtained maps of temperature and rainfall change, on the basis of the HadCM2 run.
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resource stress in 2050, 2080 and 2100 between the mitigation and baseline
scenarios. There is no difference, however, in 2020 because there is little difference
in runoff between the two scenarios. Figure 3.12 shows the numbers of people
exposed to an increase in water resource stress due to climate change under the
two scenarios; the mitigation scenario reduces the numbers exposed by 135 million,
281 million and 457 million in 2050, 2080 and 2100, respectively (the numbers are
sensitive to the assumed pattern of climate change). Mitigation, however, does not
eliminate the impact of climate change, and adaptation will clearly be required for
2100 Baseline
% change (relative to 1961–1990
n.a
< –60
–60 - –30
15 - 30
30 - 60
60 - 500
> 500–30 - –15
–15 - 15
2100 Mitigation
Fig. 3.11. Change in runoff by 2100s. The ﬁgure shows the percentage change in
average annual runoff by the 2050s, relative to 1961–1990, under the baseline and
mitigation scenario. (See colour plate section.)
Fig. 3.12. Numbers of people exposed to increase in water resource stress due to
climate change, under the baseline and mitigation scenarios. The simulations are
based on the HadCM2 climate model pattern.
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the remaining billion people exposed to a situation of water resource stress due to
climate change. Underlying results show that the effects of mitigation are regionally
variable, and in some circumstances, mitigation appears to increase the numbers of
people exposed to increased stress. This occurs because of the non-linear response
of runoff in some circumstances to gradually changing rainfall and temperature.
The indicator used is a measure of exposure to water resource stress, and does not
represent the actual water stress (which is determined by water management
structures and practices). In a sense, it can be viewed as an index of ‘adaptation
demand’, deﬁning adaptation as the introduction of management practices to reduce
the increased exposure to water resource stress. Adaptation may include measures to
increase water storage, transport of water, or reduction of water demand by increas-
ing efﬁciency. Another way of characterising adaptation is to assume that the aim of
adaptation is to eliminate water resource stress. The effect of climate change on this
demand for adaptation is indexed by the difference in exposure with and without
climate change.
3.4.5 Coasts: sea level rise
Another important impact of climate change results from increasing sea levels. For
this we used the DIVA model (version 2.0.3; see model appendix) to explore the
vulnerability of coastal zones to sea level rise. The expected global sea level rise in
2025 is 19 cm (since the pre-industrial age) in both scenarios. In later years the
scenarios start to diverge, with sea level rise in 2050 being 31 cm in the mitigation
scenario and 35 cm in the baseline scenario, and in 2100 the rise is 49 cm and 71 cm,
respectively.
The model simulates costs of damage caused by sea level rise and associated
storm surges as well as costs of adaptation in terms of dike building and nourishing
beaches, assuming (i) no adaptation, or alternatively (ii) optimal adaptation
(DINAS-COAST Consortium, 2006; Hinkel and Klein, 2007) . Figure 3.13 shows
that the sum of damages and adaptation costs are highest for the baseline case and
lowest for the mitigation scenario with adaptation. The ﬁgure also shows that
adaptation reduces overall costs rather effectively. The necessity of engaging in
adaptation even under an ambitious mitigation effort is underlined by the fact that
costs in the mitigation-only scenario, are much larger than the costs in the
adaptation-only scenario. For sea level rise, more damages can be avoided through
an adaptation-only strategy than through a mitigation-only strategy, although the
combination of the two has the strongest positive impact. The causes of the
increasing costs over time are the gradually rising sea level and rising GDP. While
the costs involve substantial investment ﬂows (10s of billions of US$ worldwide),
they are a relatively small fraction of global GDP, even for sea level rise at the level
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of the baseline scenario,. However, for individual countries or regions (particularly
small island states) these costs can be a much larger fraction of income.
3.4.6 Industry, settlements and society: Heating and cooling demand
Since the demand for space cooling and heating is linked to climate, it is expected
to be inﬂuenced by climate change. We have used some simple relationships to
describe heating and air conditioning demand in the residential sector, and explore
the impacts of climate change on this simulated energy demand (Isaac and van
Vuuren, 2009). It should be noted that changes in population and income are
projected to lead to a considerable growth in the energy demand for heating and
air conditioning in the coming century (see Fig. 3.14, no climate change case).
Changes in cooling and heating practices are examples of that part of adaptation
to climate change which is expected to occur ‘autonomously’ (i.e. without policy
intervention). As a result, we do not have a separate adaptation scenario, but include
adaptation in all scenarios. This is not perfect adaptation, however, since the extent
to which a population is able to fulﬁll demand for space conditioning depends on
income. Unfulﬁlled demand for heating and cooling can lead to health impacts
(as described in Section 3.4.2) and to loss of labour productivity. In addition to these
effects, which can be costed in a relatively straightforward way, there is reduced
comfort when indoor temperatures are not optimal.
Figure 3.14 shows that globally the increase in energy demand with time is much
larger than the difference between the energy demand in the baseline scenario, the
Fig. 3.13. Global total annual adaptation costs and damages up to 2100 as a result
of sea level rise, as modelled in the DIVA model using the ADAM scenarios.
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mitigation scenario, and the values calculated without taking climate change into
account. The effect of climate change on the combined energy demand is also
smaller than the effect on heating and air conditioning individually, since increases
in air conditioning compensate decreases in heating. On the regional and country
level, impacts can be far more substantial: for example, India, where a large increase
in energy demand is due to increased cooling, and Western Europe and the USA
where there is a substantial decrease in energy demand due to reduced heating.
3.4.7 Changes in extreme weather events
Climate change is expected to include changes in frequency and intensity of some
weather-related extreme events. Extremes like ﬂoods, droughts, storm surges and
‘warm’ extremes are projected to become more frequent, widespread, and intense,
while cold-extremes, such as cold spells, are likely to become less frequent and
weaker. Assessing risks on the basis of changes in average conditions runs the risks
that changes in extreme event risks are averaged out over temporal and spatial
scales. A more risk-based, geographically explicit method is therefore preferable
(see Chapter 8, Mechler et al.). Substantial progress has yet to be made, however, as
comprehensive knowledge on disaster impacts and risks is limited and heteroge-
neous in nature, and uncertainties, particularly for future projections, are very large.
For example, climate models do not always agree whether precipitation increases or
decreases. Furthermore, ﬂood risk analysis is hampered by a lack of modelled
variability in precipitation events and coarse resolution of events, often only allow-
ing assessments in terms of sensitivity analyses.
Fig. 3.14. Global annual energy demand for heating and air conditioning in the
residential sector in the year 2000 and during the coming century for two scenarios
(baseline and mitigation) and if no climate change at all is assumed (TIMER
model).
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There was no global assessment of extreme events in the ADAM project, but we
provide here a few examples of other work in the context of the ADAM scenarios.
The global average number of people affected by ﬂooding each year is about 50
million. Hirabayashi and Kanae (2008) and Kundzewicz et al. (2009) compared
changes in the number of people affected by ﬂoods for different degrees of global
warming. For 2 °C warming above pre-industrial levels the number is projected to
be 211 million, while for 4 °C warming it rises to 544 million. Impacts of ﬂood
disasters on human welfare are likely to occur disproportionately in countries with
low adaptation capacity. Projected ﬂooded area in Bangladesh, the most ﬂood-
vulnerable country in the world, is expected to increase by at least 23 to 29% with
a global temperature rise of 2 °C (Mirza et al., 2003). However, the uncertainty of
socio-economic factors and adaptation still leads to a wide range of estimates for the
costs of future ﬂood damage. With respect to drought, the projections for the 2090s
made by Burke et al. (2006), using scenarios comparable to our baseline case, show
a net overall global drying trend. The proportion of the global land surface suffering
from extreme drought is predicted to increase by a factor of 10 to 30; from one to
three percent for the present day to about 30 percent by the 2090s. The number of
extreme drought events per 100 years and mean drought duration are likely to
increase by factors of two and six, respectively, by the 2090s.
Rising costs due to weather-related extreme events are already increasing the
need for effective economic and ﬁnancial risk management. The costs of major
events are expected to range from several percent of annual regional GDP and
income in very large regions with very strong economies, to more than 25 percent in
smaller areas. (Parry et al., 2007).
3.4.8 Economic evaluation of impacts
Cost–beneﬁt analysis (CBA) can be used to express the costs and beneﬁts of climate
change of different strategies (see Section 3.1) in terms of a common monetary unit.
These costs are discounted into net present value calculations. The costs include:
(i) real, measurable, economic costs (so-called market costs); and (ii) other impacts
expressed in monetary terms on the basis of an ‘assumed’ value, such as the loss of
biodiversity cost based on the willingness-to-pay concept. In the past, damage
functions have been published as part of work on various integrated assessment
models (see Hof et al., 2008). More recently, damage estimates for the DICE model
were extended with explicit adaptation cost estimates (De Bruin et al., 2007). We
have used the FAIR model (see model appendix) to develop economic costs
estimates under these scenarios, especially to assess the impact of relevant uncer-
tainties (Hof et al., 2009; Hof et al., 2008). Some important observations are that
most models typically assess the costs of mitigation to be between zero and three
3. Scenarios as the basis for assessment 79
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/489794/WORKINGFOLDER/HUE/9780521119412C03.3D 80 [54–86] 18.8.2009 5:38PM
percent of GDP, for optimal implementation of 450 ppm CO2e stabilisation scenar-
ios at a global scale (Fisher et al., 2007). Regional costs can be considerably higher,
for example, greater than 10% for oil-exporting countries. A few models report net
economic gains even for very stringent stabilisation targets such as in the case of
Barker et al. (2006; 2008). At the same time, estimates of the costs of impacts of
climate change vary over a very wide range. While the damage curves for a baseline
scenario included in most models typically lead to costs in the order of a few per cent
of GDP, under extreme assumptions, these costs may be up to 25% or higher.
Finally, adaptation investments are mostly assessed to be smaller than mitigation
investments and residual damages. However, they are very important in limiting
residual damages. While uncertainties imply that CBA cannot be used to provide
quantitative results on optimal mitigation and adaptation levels, the outcomes can
very well be used to explore the impacts of different assumptions.
Under default settings of the FAIR model, the discounted costs as share of GDP
due to climate change impacts for the period 2005–2200 at 2.5% discount rate
amount to nearly 4.5% in the baseline (Fig. 3.15). These costs rise sharply over time,
reaching 17% in 2200. Adaptation or mitigation reduces these costs substantially
to around 2.5%. The adaptation scenario results in relatively low costs due to
discounting, as in the long-run this scenario still leads to 8% costs of GDP in
2200. By comparison, the mitigation scenario leads to less than 2% costs of GDP
in 2200, but follows a completely different time proﬁle, with mitigation costs early
in the century. The combination of mitigation and adaptation leads to the lowest
discounted costs, namely 2%.
Fig. 3.15. Mitigation costs, adaptation costs, and residual damages due to climate
change as share of GDP according to the FAIR model (Hof et al., 2009).
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A crucial caveat needs mentioning at this point with regard to the economic
evaluation of climate change impacts. First of all, calculations cannot be regarded
as reliable for the extreme tails of risks (i.e. low probability, high impact events).
As a subjective assessment on how to handle such risks is involved, Weitzman
(2008) questioned the usefulness of CBA for policy makers. Secondly, the value
of the discount rate to account for time preference and risk is currently heavily
debated, with arguments relating to subjective time preference and risk perception
(Nordhaus, 2008; Price, 2005; Stern, 2006). Finally, irreversible changes, for
example a warming of the oceans leading to the loss of coral reefs, need subjective
quantiﬁcation of damages (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004).
3.4.9 Uncertainties in climate change, impacts and adaptation
There are many sources of uncertainty in projections of future climate change and its
impacts. Uncertainties are associated with every step in the causal chain shown in
Figure 3.2: emissions, climatic drivers (e.g. the carbon cycle), climate (mainly
climate sensitivity and pattern of climate change), and impacts (including adaptive
capacity). The initial uncertainty, relating to future human development, is con-
siderably ampliﬁed along this chain This is illustrated by the fact that, under the
same emission scenario, different models give rise to different impacts, due to
model differences in the later steps in the chain. This difference is often larger
than that arising in one model with different emission scenarios. For example, for
precipitation changes until the end of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the multi-model
ensemble mean exceeds the inter-model standard deviation only at high latitudes
(Kundzewicz et al., 2007). Uncertainties in climate change projections increase with
the length of the time horizon. In the near term (e.g. the 2020s), climate model
uncertainties play the most important role; while over longer time horizons (e.g. the
2090s), uncertainties due to the selection of emissions scenario become increasingly
signiﬁcant (Jenkins and Lowe, 2003).
The impact of future climate change on extreme events is particularly uncertain.
This is partly due to a mismatch between the larger spatial and temporal scale of
coarse-resolution climate models, and the local occurrence and short life of some
weather extremes (e.g. cloudburst precipitation and ﬂash ﬂoods). Impacts and
adaptation are most relevant at the local scale, as people experience events in a
particular time and place. Resolving the mismatches at both the spatial and the
temporal scale requires downscaling, giving rise to another source of uncertainty, no
matter which method of downscaling is used.
Uncertainty has implications for adaptation. The large range of projections
observed in different climate model-based scenarios (cf. ENSEMBLES Project of
the EU) suggests that planning for adaptation should not be based on a limited
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number of scenarios, since the range of simulations obtained might not represent the
full range possible. Robust adaptation procedures, which do not rely on precise
projections of changes, therefore need to be developed.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed how scenario analysis may contribute to the
assessment of mitigation and adaptation strategies. We have also presented two
scenarios used in the ADAM project as a starting point for analysis. We speciﬁed
impacts in those scenarios for a selected number of parameters, focusing mainly on
mean climate changes. Further improvements can be made by focusing on extreme
events and by exploring the implications of various risk levels. Both the IPCC
(Parry et al., 2007) and the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) made a more comprehensive
overview of impacts as a function of global mean temperature rise, but did not
couple impacts to speciﬁc scenarios. Figure 3.16 shows the impacts as assessed by
the Stern review, indicating the position of the two ADAM scenarios on the climate
change axis.
(i) We described two sets of possible climate change trajectories for the world for analysis
of mitigation, adaptation and impacts. The ﬁrst set, including the so-called baseline
and adaptation scenario without climate policies, is expected to lead to a global mean
temperature increase by the end of the century of around 4 °C (for the most likely
values for climate parameters, and current economic trends). This scenario has high
adaptation needs as explicitly described in the adaptation scenario. The second scenario
assumes stringent mitigation and limits global mean temperature change to 2 °C, with a
probability of 50%, using known techniques and costing one to two percent of GDP.
Even under this scenario, adaptation measures will still be needed.
(ii) While it is possible to explore different consequences of scenarios (including uncer-
tainties) it is not practical to scientiﬁcally determine an optimal mix between mitiga-
tion, adaptation and residual damages. As discussed in this chapter, the weighing of
the consequences of climate change and the various policy responses is complicated by
large differences in scale, space and time; large uncertainties; and clear differences in
interest between individual actors. As a result, subjective interpretation of risks will
always play an important role.
(iii) Effective climate policy includes both adaptation and mitigation. Even the most
stringent climate policy scenarios can still result in a global mean temperature increase
of more than 2.5 °C and at best a temperature increase of 1.5 °C. The need for a
combination of mitigation and adaptation has been shown for most of the impacts
explored in this chapter. For example, adaptation can be more effective than mitigation
in dealing with sea level rise, but mitigation still has a role to play in reducing damages
and costs of adaptation. Agriculture presents an example where adaptation and mitiga-
tion are both clearly necessary. Crop yields in agriculture are projected to be negatively
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impacted by climate change in the absence of both adaptation and mitigation action.
Without stringent mitigation, adaptation could limit negative impacts, but not remove
them.
(iv) While impacts of climate change can be severe and, depending on subjective choices,
may warrant stringent climate policy, these impacts are not necessarily of the order of
magnitude that signiﬁcantly undermine assumptions of population and economic
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Fig. 3.16. Stabilisation levels and probability ranges for temperature increases
(Stern, 2006), with lines marking the temperature change for the baseline and
mitigation scenarios.
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growth at a global scale. Current ‘middle-of-the-road’ estimates of mitigation costs
and climate damage are likely to be in the order of a few percent of GDP.While climate
change may have an impact on millions of people, other challenges are likely to
inﬂuence global population growth more signiﬁcantly. It should be noted, however,
that the impacts of climate damages might be too low. Mitigation studies are often
optimistic in assuming global participation, while studies on damages are almost
exclusively focused on changes in average climate. In an analytical context, the
severity of impacts is relevant; although there might be merit in improved integration
of impacts and adaptation, low costs negate the need for global analysis to include all
feedbacks on main drivers based on the consistency of the storylines. Clearly, at the
local scale, the situation is likely to be very different; impacts for individual countries
can be far more substantial than at the global scale.
(v) Impacts may differ very much between locations. Sea level rise is very important for
some low-lying island states and countries. These countries could be signiﬁcantly
affected, or even destroyed, by large adaptation costs and/or damages. For agriculture,
positive and negative impacts are projected to occur in different places and at different
times, with low-income countries often experiencing greater negative impacts. The
wealthier north, where agriculture is currently temperature-limited, would beneﬁt.
(vi) Important focus areas for further analysis include variability and extreme events and
the role of governance. In our work, we focus on changes in mean values. There is
strong evidence that changes in probability of extreme events may be of more relevance
than mean values, but information on this is still scarce. The role of different actors is
another issue; some forms of adaptation require active governmental involvement;
other measures, such as installation of space cooling systems, are likely to be imple-
mented by private investors. The differences between these two adaptation protago-
nists are relevant for scenario development.
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